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In its Millennium Declaration of September 2000, the 
United Nations (UN) adopted the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs), to be reached in 2015 
through concerted efforts worldwide. According to 
UN calculations, the estimated costs in terms of 
additional development aid of meeting the MDGs in 
all countries vary from US$121 billion in 2006 to 
$189 billion in 2015. It appears that while Asia is well 
on track to achieving the goals, essentially through 
its own efforts, Africa is lagging behind. But how 
realistic are these levels of funding? And regarding 
the goals themselves, are the necessary mechanisms 
in place to monitor their realization, and do the 
proposed measures promote sustainable 
development? These questions are the focus of this 
brief.  
The UN’s 2005 MDG report does not focus on 
replacing all other development efforts. It typically 
aims to send a can-do message to the developed 
world that calls not for fundamental change but, 
rather, for a modest additional financial contribution 
of US$48–74 billion annually until 2015. There is 
undoubted merit in widely circulating the message 
that the world’s most serious problems can be solved 
at relatively low cost. In this regard, the MDG 
process has been instrumental in putting 
development back on the international agenda. 
Furthermore, agreeing on a list of targets has 
practical value in helping to keep donors dedicated to 
a common development agenda, facilitating the 
coordination of aid among donor countries to 
promote economies of scale, and providing a well-
defined list of regularly monitored targets to 
encourage public support for development 
cooperation. Nonetheless, creating hope is one thing; 
generating unfounded expectations is another. The 
MDG process asks the public for funds that 
eventually will have to be repaid in terms of success. 
Hence, there is a definite need to consolidate the 
process by focusing on realistic aims that are well 
cast in an overall development perspective reliable 
monitoring and, obviously, credible funding 
assessments. 
United Nations Financing Estimates 
Various figures have been circulated on the amount 
of funding needed to achieve the MDGs in 2015: the 
UN report mentions an additional US$50 billion 
annually. While conceding that this estimate is crude 
at best, the UN report expresses a firm belief that it 
provides a good indication of the order of magnitude 
of the funding required. Starting from a “shopping 
list” of targets, the 2005 UN Millennium Project 
provides an independent assessment based on 
costings of target quantities at assumed prices for a 
handful of countries. The actions identified and 
costed lead to a funding budget generally rising from 
US$77.5 per capita in 2006 to $140.5 per capita in 
2015—half of which is to be obtained from 
household contributions and domestic government 
expenditure. The last step in the estimation of total 
financing requirements is to use the per capita 
investment needs to compute the total investment 
required to achieve these goals worldwide, totaling 
the amounts obtained after multiplication of the 
average per capita need by the relevant segments of 
the population in low-income countries. Furthermore, 
an estimate is presented of the financing needs for 
middle-income countries and for some actions at the 
global level. The resulting financing gap to be 
covered by official development assistance (ODA) 
amounts to US$135 billion in 2006, $152 billion in 
2010, and $195 billion in 2015, which would imply an 
increase in ODA over existing commitments of 
US$48, $50, and $74 billion, respectively.  
An important element of the costing is the 
assumption that there is a committed, well-organized 
public sector. The calculation of total ODA even 
includes an “adjustment for countries not qualifying 
due to inadequate governance,” by which US$21–25 
billion are deducted from the total requirements to 
reflect the exclusion of some countries—implying 
that other countries should contribute more to the 
attainment. The report suggests that in assessing the 
quality of governance, a clear distinction can be 
made between deliberate unwillingness on the part 
of those in power to act in the best interest of the 
country, and failures caused by poverty and lack of 
institutional capacity. Only the first category of 
countries is excluded; hence, many countries remain, 
especially in Africa, where improved government 
reach and quality requires major investments.  
What Is Overlooked in the Estimates? 
The MDG report expresses its cost assessments in 
per capita terms and points to the striking similarity 
of the estimates for the five countries that serve as 
benchmark cases, suggesting that this warrants 
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generalization to other countries. This section looks 
at the calculations of MDG investment needs in 
health, transport infrastructure, and education (close 
to 60 percent of the total investment needs in the 
report) primarily to highlight that, although the 
report mentions most of the possible items, the 
actual budgeting omits many items and scale-
independent costs and makes optimistic assumptions 
about the quality of governance. Moreover, the 
report tends to neglect the upward cost push of up-
scaling services resulting from intensified use of 
scarce skills and material resources. 
Health 
The MDGs on health cover a broad range of topics, 
such as reducing the under-five mortality rate by 
two-thirds and the maternal mortality rate by three-
quarters, and halting and having begun to reverse 
the spread of HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis, and 
other major diseases. The report estimates that per 
capita investments of US$13–25 in 2005, $19–33 in 
2010, and $30–48 in 2015 will be sufficient to 
achieve these goals. Such statements, however, 
neglect many minor diseases that together burden a 
sizable share of the population. 
The Center for Global Development ranks a 
number of successful projects with respect to the 
eradication of diseases through vaccination 
campaigns or treatment programs. Treatment of 
malaria and leprosy—two important diseases in 
developing countries—are not included in the list. 
Estimates on the costs of malaria treatment vary 
from US$0.1 to $9 per treatment, depending on the 
resistance of the disease to cheaper drugs in the 
area considered. For the treatment of leprosy, 
estimates of treatment costs per patient vary from 
US$20 to $30. Factoring in the costs of treatment of 
these diseases, the total annual per capita health 
cost already equals half the average needs for 2006 
and takes up more than a quarter of the estimated 
average investment need in 2015. In addition, there 
are also diseases for which no adequate therapy is 
available at present and for which the costs of 
therapy and/or vaccination are as yet unknown. 
Since the MDGs on health also include a well-
functioning health system in general, costs of 
achieving this should also be factored into the total. 
A further complication in the treatment of many of 
these illnesses is that treatment should start almost 
immediately after the disease has been contracted, 
and often involves extended regular visits to clinics. 
This requires that health services be located near 
patients, which is especially costly in view of the 
dispersed nature of settlements in many parts of 
Africa. HIV and AIDS obviously require special 
attention. The latest estimates show that in Africa 
25.8 million people were HIV infected in 2005, of 
which 3.2 million represented new infections in that 
year, while 2.4 million people were estimated to have 
died from AIDS that same year. Additional resources 
are needed for treatment and prevention, including 
training teachers and strengthening systems of 
distribution for preservatives, outreach programs, and 
training of health care workers to provide advanced 
treatment. Furthermore, degree training should be 
included for health personnel. Finally, infrastructure 
should be expanded to offer a larger percentage of 
the population access to schools and health facilities. 
In the case of Thailand, a densely populated country 
with a well-functioning health care system to start 
with, the annual costs of addressing AIDS are already 
almost US$6 per capita, suggesting that any cost 
estimate for AIDS treatment and prevention in Africa 
should be far above this average. 
In short, judging by the cost of the items 
explicitly listed, the shopping list neglects certain 
diseases, the cost of developing the health delivery 
system and providing surrounding infrastructure, and 
more generally the cost of up-scaling present 
activities to the required levels. 
Transport Infrastructure 
Poor infrastructure is often mentioned as one of the 
most important bottlenecks inhibiting growth and 
development in Africa. While the UN Millennium 
Project refers to several items, there is no separate 
entry for investment in telecommunications. For 
roads, the estimated per capita investment needs are 
in the range of US$11–13 in 2006, $10–21 in 2010, 
and $10–31 in 2015 for the cost of maintaining and 
expanding road networks only. The report does 
state, however, that “a more comprehensive 
assessment must factor in the costs of improving 
access to transport services as well as expanding 
ports and other transport infrastructure” (pp. 243–
244). Suffice it to say, the financial implications of 
this statement would definitely not be minor. 
Furthermore, the construction of physical 
infrastructure is only one of the many steps needed 
to arrive at a well-functioning transport system. 
Assuring security along the roads is at least equally 
important. The cost of achieving security on 
transport infrastructure, especially in Africa, is 
particularly high due to the widespread rural 
population, low intensity of road traffic, and pressing 
need to monitor the police force itself. As an 
admittedly special point of reference, it should be 
noted that the 2006 UN intervention in Sudan 
budgeted almost US$1 billion to help 6.1 million 
people. Even for transport proper, costs are only to a 
limited extent proportionate to scale. The World Food 
Programme (WFP) budget for the 2005–06 food aid 
operations primarily for the Darfur region shows the 
cost of providing 730,000 metric tons of food. The 
current costs of procurement and transport are about 
US$163 million ($27 per capita). Total estimated 
costs for WFP are 4.5 times as high ($746 million) 
and include many items that are independent of the 
scale of the operations, such as assistance on tertiary 
roads that are normally considered unsuitable for 
commercial transport, emergency road repairs and 
mine clearance, rehabilitation of river assets, 
emergency upgrading of infrastructure, creation of 
storage facilities, and expansion of field offices. 
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Reference to the costs of food aid operations is 
of special relevance in Africa because of the large 
number of people who depend on it. On average, 
during the period 1985–2000, some 30 million people 
in Sub-Saharan Africa were partly or fully dependent 
on food aid that, for more than three-quarters, had 
to be obtained via seaports. Of these, about 5–6 
million people are fully dependent on food aid; and 
of them, 2.5 million—and rising—are living in refugee 
camps due to the many conflicts, which might 
eventually strain the MDG resource. Sub-Saharan 
Africa harbored around 90 refugee camps in 2000 
with populations from a few hundred to over 
350,000 people. To give an indication of the logistics 
involved, the average distance of the seven largest 
camps, with populations of 100,000 or more, to the 
nearest seaport is 3,300 kilometers by road, and the 
Sudan operation mentioned earlier is not unique in 
the scope of activities required to transport food. 
The Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations (FAO) provides an Africa-wide 
overview showing the investment needed to upgrade 
rural infrastructure. The total per capita investment 
of US$11–15 annually already covers the lion’s share 
of the estimates made in the UN Millennium Project, 
and given that the investment reported covers rural 
infrastructure only in a narrow sense, it is clear that 
the total costs will be much higher. The inclusion of 
irrigation schemes, for example, increases the annual 
per capita costs for 2006, 2010, and 2015 to US$16, 
$25, and $32, respectively.  
Education 
The MDG on education is to achieve universal 
primary education for boys and girls in 2015. The 
estimated per capita requirements mentioned in the 
report also include secondary education: “our 
education estimates build upon the Education for All 
estimates by also including secondary school 
education” (p. 243). The estimated annual per capita 
investments needed to achieve this goal are US$11–
17 in 2005, $13–19 in 2010, and $17–25 in 2015. 
The estimates seem particularly low because 
achieving universal primary education in many 
countries requires major up-scaling of the number of 
teachers. While the United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization estimates that 
about US$7–8 per capita would be required to pay 
the salaries of the additional 18 million teachers, the 
costs of educating these teachers should also be 
taken into account. Cost calculation for this is not 
straightforward, as it is clear that the additional 
demand for education will put more pressure on the 
already fragile system, but even a low estimate of 
the cost of training only new teachers results in 
figures in the range of US$10 per capita. In addition, 
expanding the education sector also requires 
investments in buildings and educational materials. 
Measuring Progress 
A primary goal in defining the MDGs was to create a 
list of objectives that could be quantified and then 
monitored for progress. Measuring the number of 
undernourished people is particularly problematic, 
however: the FAO estimates that approximately 204 
million people are undernourished in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, but comparable estimates using body weight 
measurements in demographic and health surveys 
result in a much lower figure of approximately 120 
million people. Such discrepancies cast doubt on the 
accuracy of MDG 1 yardsticks and, consequently, the 
assessment of subsequent progress. 
Conclusion 
Setting up clear lists of explicit policy targets such as 
the MDGs can be effective in providing general 
background on the magnitude and importance of the 
task at hand and in mobilizing public support. The 
cost calculations associated with the MDGs generally 
convey the message that achieving the goals is a 
matter of goodwill, and that a relatively minor 
financial effort over the next 15 years will suffice. If 
the MDGs are primarily intended to rally taxpayer 
support for increased development aid, then the 
accuracy of the cost calculations is of lesser 
importance. What counts are the achievements 
realized with the tax money spent.  
The Millennium Village initiative of the Millennium 
Projects seems to focus on this aspect and aims to 
show that, with good management and adequate 
investments, African communities throughout the 
continent can flourish. The underlying idea is that 
success will breed success—locally because the good 
practices will be emulated by other villages, and 
globally because the donor agencies and commercial 
investors will become less shy once they see positive 
and tangible results. Small rural villages in this 
initiative, however, can at best become showrooms 
of progress; they will often be no more than classic 
Potemkin villages visited by television crews during 
special campaigns, as well as by rich individuals in 
search of a philanthropic project. Moreover, the 
international community cannot neglect the moral 
implications of selecting a happy few to receive 
medical care, education, sanitation, and the like, 
while leaving the large majority outside the fence.  
The shopping-list approach pursued by the 
Millennium Project carries, among other factors, the 
danger of omission. In the case of health, it is the 
omission of a host of nonmajor diseases and the 
requirement to build a network of skilled staff to 
monitor medication intake and effects on patients. 
For transport infrastructure, it is the scale-
independent cost of delivery related to police 
surveillance and the improvement and maintenance 
of tertiary roads. For education, it appears that 
neglecting the teachers needed to teach the teachers 
and the requirements for construction and adequate 
maintenance of schools has led to serious cost 
underestimation. Furthermore, shopping lists treat 
prices as given, whereas development experience 
indicates that targeted efforts tend to generate local 
scarcities of trained personnel and other inputs that 
trigger price increases. More generally, establishing 
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adequate government institutions to provide security 
and justice in addition to health, education, 
transport, and irrigation facilities involves high levels 
of scale-independent costs.  
In addition, if the targets are actually meant to 
be reached, rather than functioning as mere symbolic 
reflections of moral concern and public relations 
tools, they should be defined in detail, and adequate 
measurement procedures should be agreed upon to 
monitor progress in meeting them. Indeed, by 
making the concepts more clear, and by agreeing on 
them internationally, the MDG undertaking has made 
significant steps in this direction, but greater efforts 
are needed to arrive at reliable indicators.  
Finally, it seems remarkable for the UN to define 
its own agenda for development at a time when Asia 
(China and India in particular) is teaching the world 
at an unprecedented scale and pace what 
development is about. Asia is convincingly 
demonstrating that growth is indeed the solution to 
poverty, but equally that an MDG time horizon of 15 
years may be too short for results to become visible. 
Asia also demonstrates that growth starts in urban 
agglomerations, absorbing labor from the 
surroundings and gradually spreading via labor 
migration from less-favored or less-well-governed 
areas, followed by gradual industrial expansion to 
these areas. In this process, trade liberalization is 
important as fuel for growth, but government has its 
role in keeping up physical and social infrastructure, 
in providing social safety nets, and in spreading 
progress across the territory.  
All this illustrates the tension between defining 
separate and simple targets with associated 
externally funded projects and financing 
requirements, and the broader idea of development. 
The MDG approach appeals to a public tired of 
stories of how the complexity of development makes 
it difficult, if not impossible, to implement simple 
policies with clear effects. But the Asian experience 
also teaches that development is organic: given 
proper general guidance from government, it finds 
its own way through the markets without central 
control of every detail or ideal circumstances in all 
cases. For Africa, this would suggest identifying 
potential winners, with South Africa—and, hopefully, 
Nigeria and its West African neighbors—as a natural 
candidate. For development cooperation with Africa, 
this would amount to betting on such winners in 
terms of trade concessions and industrial 
development rather than focusing on the least 
developed countries that lack the capacity to deliver 
substantial quantities anyway—notwithstanding the 
need to maintain humanitarian aid flows and to help 
achieve basic levels of infrastructure in less 
promising areas. At the same time, it should be 
recognized that the eventual spatial configuration of 
African regional partnerships remains unclear. In the 
meantime, Europe might choose to act as a growth 
pole, but for this it would have to relax its 
restrictions on labor migration, which seems unlikely 
at present. Above all, the Asian experience is 
relevant to Africa in so far as countries that only 30 
years ago were commonly portrayed as the basket 
cases of the world have almost simultaneously, and 
despite rising dependence on imported energy and 
other mineral resources, shown an incredible 
capacity to reduce poverty and hunger. 
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